Canadian Agriculture: Struggling to Grow, or Struggling to be Recognized? (Part 4)

Share

Part 4: From Problem to Solution

1. Where we left off

So far, this series focusing on Canadian agricultural productivity has reviewed the prevalent perspectives, taken a walk through the financial realities that farmers face, and explored the relationship that exists between research funding and real-world outcomes. Part 3 promised a fourth and final post on what the solutions look like. To keep each post a manageable read, that final instalment is now split in two. This post draws three threads from the series so far, sets out a test for proposed solutions and weighs the leverage points against it. Part 5 will look at what current policy is taking out of the system, what we still cannot measure, and what the series adds up to.

First, Canada’s productivity record is stronger than the headline narrative suggests, and the global slowdown in agricultural TFP is not a Canadian problem alone (Part 1, Part 3). Second, funding level is a weak predictor of outcome: Australia raised private R&D dollars and still posted negative TFP growth (Part 3). Third, the binding constraint appears to sit on the demand side, in adoption, extension and absorptive capacity, which is the part of the chain that policy reports cover least and Canada tracks the worst. A 2026 scoping review of digital tools in Canadian crop production finds the same pattern: producers’ main barriers are cost against benefit, data privacy and unreliable connectivity, not a shortage of technology.

Admittedly, this series is weakest on institutional detail and program evaluation; its strength is testing whether claims hold up against the available data.

2. Shifting Paradigms

The reports, publications, and posts that inspired this series expose true areas of concern, and new ideas are proposed regularly. One recurring theme, however, is that when Canadian agricultural productivity is discussed, farmers tend to be the neglected group.

Almost every recommendation sits upstream of the gravel driveway: money in, institutions built, talent recruited. Very few name a farm-level outcome as the measure of success, and almost none say how we would know. The default instrument is a new thing, whether a hub, a corporation, a platform or a network. Yet the same proponents of advancing Canada’s agricultural productivity tend to cite fragmentation as a drag on the system.

This post keeps the focus on on-farm outcomes: does a proposal plausibly change what happens in a field, or only what happens upstream of it?

3. A Test for Proposed Solutions

The proposals in Section 4 are weighed against six criteria.

Criterion
The question it asks
Why it matters here
On-farm outcome
Does this plausibly change what happens in the field, or only upstream of it?
Part 3 located the weak link in adoption, not generation.
New money or reallocation
Does it need new public spending, or a better return on money already committed?
AAFC is under a 15 per cent savings target; “spend more” is not on the table.
Incumbent or new institution
Does it strengthen something that exists, or build something beside it?
New hubs beside weak pathways do not fix the pathway.
Time to effect
Years or decades, against a 30 to 50 year R&D lag?
R&D-only prescriptions cannot be judged inside a policy cycle.
Measurability
Would we know if it worked, and does a Canadian data series exist?
Taken up in Part 5; much of this is currently unverifiable.
Incidence
Who pays and who bears the risk: farmer, taxpayer or firm?
Farmers’ privilege and levy-matching are distributional questions.

4. Weighing the Leverage Points

This section weighs the “leverage points” Part 3 closed with against the tests above, adding talent and education, among the first recommendations in this RBC report.

The thread running through all of them is the pathway from research to practice that Part 3 identified as the weak link. These are first-pass judgements against the criteria, not measurements, for reasons Part 5 explains.

a) Extension and Knowledge Transfer: The Top of the List

This is the only leverage point that sits directly on the weak link Part 3 identified; the others work through it. If extension is thin, spillovers do not land, new varieties are not used well, and breakthrough technologies don’t make the impact that they could.

The useful observation is that Canada already has a de facto extension system. It is uneven, privately skewed and under-resourced, but it exists, and it was built by producers. Federal and provincial governments scaled back extension from the 1980s, and commodity groups and industry filled the gap (Ramírez, 2026). The result is pluralistic, but at risk of becoming fragmented: unclear reach, inconsistent advice and a tilt toward larger farms. In Saskatchewan, Agri-ARM links eight producer-directed organizations from Prince Albert to Swift Current, with an explicit objective to “increase the adoption of new agricultural production technologies and practices by producers.” In Alberta, twelve applied research associations do the equivalent, according to RDAR. In Ontario, OSCIA runs more than 50 county and district associations and delivers on-farm trials through programs such as ONFARM.

Nobody publishes a consolidated budget for Agri-ARM, the Alberta associations, or OSCIA. Most of their money is project-based funding from governments, commodity groups, and industry (Sask Wheat, 2023; OSCIA’s 2025 financial statements), not from a core extension budget. The best public aggregate is from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): roughly C$330 million in 2024 for agricultural knowledge transfer, a line that blends education with extension (see Part 5).

Two points reinforce the case. First, the proposed “Mega Deduction” lowers the upfront cost of machinery, precision hardware and software, which eases the cost side of adoption described in Part 2 and leaves the knowledge side (knowing what to buy and how to use it) more clearly the binding constraint. Second, agronomic advice bundled with product sales carries an obvious incentive problem. That is the strongest argument for a public- or producer-funded counterweight, which is exactly what the Saskatchewan sites describe themselves as: a source of “unbiased, third-party information.”

The recommendation is therefore to strengthen the applied research and demonstration networks that exist, with stable multi-year operating support and adoption outcomes written into what they report, rather than build a new body. Against the Section 3 test, it scores best of anything here: it reaches the farm gate directly, needs modest money, builds on what exists and could show results within a few years. Its weak point is measurement, and the cost falls on governments and the producer groups that already carry it.

b) Talent and Education: Retool the Incumbents

If extension is the pathway, people are what make it work. Part 1 tested the assumption that talent and education in Canadian agriculture are lacking and slowing innovation. The data told a different story: agriculture graduates already have the highest employment rate of any field, from a very small program base of 339 programs against 5,796 in business (Part 1). The constraint looks less like “students will not come” and more like “there is not much to come to.” What exists is not aimed at the innovation and on-farm decision problems the sector says it has.

The proposal is to push existing agri-business, agricultural economics and agronomy degrees toward data literacy, technology evaluation, farm-level decision analysis and the economics of technology adoption (payback periods, hurdle rates, option value under margin pressure), rather than build a new digital-agriculture institute beside the existing faculties. In practice that could mean co-op and capstone placements within commodity groups and the networks in 4a, which would also make extension and agronomy a visible career path rather than a fallback, including for students who did not grow up on a farm.

The counterargument is that building a new program is easier than reforming an old one, and new institutions attract funding that reform does not. Olds College and AI for Food (both named in the RBC report) are doing good work, so the case for reform must beat “do the easy thing,” not merely “do nothing.” On the test, retooling is cheap and builds on what exists, but it reaches the farm only indirectly and over the long run, with the cost shared by the public and students.

c) Governance: The Research and Development Corporations Model

Where 4a and 4b are about delivering knowledge, governance is about who decides what knowledge gets produced. Australia’s fifteen Research and Development Corporations (RDCs) invest roughly A$825 million a year with government matching industry levies up to 0.5 per cent of gross value of production. These RDCs are attractive because they change who sets priorities, not only how much is spent.

Canada already has half of this: commodity checkoffs plus the AgriScience clusters, which match industry money with public funds. So why do the clusters underperform? The Canadian Agri-Food Policy Institute (CAPI) points to five-year cycles without guaranteed renewal, priorities that drift toward the department’s agenda rather than producers’, and success measured by project outputs rather than cluster-level effects. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada’s (AAFC) own November 2025 evaluation found the same pattern: greater emphasis on government priorities, some cluster recipients not returning, and no indication of whether those attending knowledge-transfer events intended to use what they learned.

The recommendation is a reform of AgriScience under the Next Policy Framework, not an import: longer cycles, genuine producer priority-setting and outcome metrics that include adoption. It would reach the farm through producer priorities and run on matching funds rather than wholly new money, sharing costs and risks between producers and taxpayers. But Australia has the RDCs and negative TFP growth (Part 3), so this is a fix for priority-setting and knowledge transfer, not a productivity promise.

d) Intellectual Property and Regulation: A Monitoring Problem Now

Further upstream sit the incentives for private research and the rules new products must clear. On intellectual property, the legislative work is largely done. SOR/2026-74 narrowed farmers’ privilege by removing hybrid, fruit, vegetable, ornamental and vegetatively propagated varieties, with producer groups supportive and the National Farmers Union opposed. The cost falls mainly on growers who save seed of the excluded crops, while the risk falls on breeders investing in the expectation of returns. Any benefit reaches the farm indirectly through better varieties, years from now. The right recommendation is to wait for and measure private breeding investment and farm-level seed costs.

The Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) tax incentive followed a similar path. Budget 2025 raised the enhanced-rate expenditure limit to $6 million (from $3 million) and restored the eligibility of capital expenditures. Since April 1, 2026, businesses under $25 million in gross income can seek optional pre-claim approval, which halves processing time for pre-approved projects to 90 days. Budget 2026 proposes to widen eligibility to certain regulatory testing, certification and IP-protection costs, which matter to seed and input developers. The cost sits with taxpayers and is already committed; the open question is whether it reaches small agricultural innovators or mostly larger firms, as the Simpson Centre’s earlier critique argued. For farmers the effect is mostly indirect: the larger limit and faster approval matter most to the ag-tech, seed and input firms whose products eventually reach the field.

Regulatory timelines are where the sector’s ask and public trust intersect, and a blog post cannot resolve that. A 2025 USDA report cites industry estimates of seven to ten years from development to human-consumption approval of a novel-trait crop, one to three of which are spent in government evaluation. At the July 2026 Halifax meeting of agriculture ministers, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency highlighted accelerating product reviews by leveraging approvals from trusted regulatory partners. Against the test, plant breeders’ rights, SR&ED and regulatory review all sit furthest from the farm gate and are already in motion. They reach the farm only as better products moving down the pathway in 4a, so the job now is to measure them rather than redesign them.

e) Absorptive Capacity and Spillovers

Not all the knowledge that a pathway carries has to be Canadian. Canada is a fast follower and probably should be. Part 3 put mean US public agricultural R&D spending between 2000 and 2020 at about $5.5 billion a year in purchasing-power-parity dollars, far above Canada’s, and much of that knowledge transfers to Canadian conditions (Part 3). Part of Canada’s apparent return on its own R&D is likely a return on that borrowing.

But spillovers are not free. Capturing them takes people who can access, adapt and validate foreign research under Canadian conditions. That capacity lives in the AAFC research centres and the regional networks now being reduced (see Part 5), which ties 4e to 4a. It is cheap and builds on what exists, but it only reaches the farm if the extension link works.

One enabler sits outside agriculture policy: rural broadband. The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission’s (CRTC) 2025 market report puts access to 50/10 Mbps unlimited service at 78.2 per cent of rural households in 2023, up from 45.6 per cent in 2019, leaving more than one in five without it. That is household access, not farm-level reliability, so it is not comparable with CAPI’s 54 per cent for 2022. Many of the tools the Mega Deduction makes cheaper rely on connectivity, so a coverage gap is also an adoption gap.

5. Where this Leaves Us

Weighed against the test, the leverage points sort by distance from the farm gate. Extension sits on the weak link itself. Talent and absorptive capacity supply the people that link depends on. Cluster governance decides what flows toward it, and IP, tax and regulation work further upstream still, paying off only if everything below them holds. The options that score best are the least glamorous: stable support for the applied research and extension networks that already exist, a cluster program that counts adoption, and degrees aimed at the decisions farmers actually make. Part 5, the last post in the series, asks whether recent policy points the same way, starting with what is being taken out of the system, and why nobody can yet tell whether any of it is working at the farm gate.

Koal Sammons

Recent Posts

Let’s Talk About Italian Lemon Groves

A visual journal of the Amalfi Coast Here, on SAIFood, we tend to focus on… Read More

11/17/2026

A Loose Intro to Precision Fermentation

In a marketplace constantly asking for diversity and sustainability in addition to food quality, globally,… Read More

11/10/2026

Are our Food Messages Aligned?

Reflections from Cultivating Resilience One of the advantages of being in the agricultural space is… Read More

11/05/2026

Canada’s Rye-or-Die Bread Choice

Canadians love sandwiches. Whether you're enjoying a heavily stacked beef dip from the diner two… Read More

11/03/2026

Canada Approves its First Gene-edited Pig for Human Consumption

By: Victoria Tenor In January 2026, Canada took a step forward in agricultural biotechnology by… Read More

10/27/2026

The Summer That Fruit Met the Elements

The increasing frequency of climatic events are forcing Canadian fruit farmers to build resiliency faster… Read More

10/22/2026